Student with epilepsy denied evening instruction sues school; Supreme Court unanimously rejects heightened "bad faith or gross misjudgment" standard for disability discrimination claims in education, holding that students need not meet a higher bar than other disability discrimination plaintiffs.
Facts: A.J.T. is a teenage girl with a rare and severe form of epilepsy that causes frequent morning seizures, preventing her from attending school before noon. However, she is alert and capable of learning in the afternoon and evening hours. Before moving to Minnesota in 2015, her prior school districts accommodated her disability by providing evening instruction.
Upon moving to the Osseo Area School District, her parents repeatedly requested similar evening instruction through her Individualized Education Program (IEP). The district refused these requests, later found by courts to be based on "administrative convenience" rather than A.J.T.'s educational needs. As a result, A.J.T. received only 4.25 hours of daily instruction compared to 6.5 hours for non-disabled students.
Statutory Framework: Three federal laws intersect in this case:
Crucially, a 1986 amendment to the IDEA, codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l), explicitly preserves rights and remedies under the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and other federal laws. This provision was Congress's direct response to the Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984), which had held the IDEA was the exclusive remedy for education-related disability claims.
Unanimous Decision: Roberts, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court Concurring Opinions:
The Court held that schoolchildren bringing claims under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act are not required to make a heightened showing of "bad faith or gross misjudgment." These claims are subject to the same standards that apply in other disability discrimination contexts. The Court vacated and remanded but explicitly declined to define the generally applicable standard for liability or damages.
Majority Opinion (Roberts, C.J.)
The Chief Justice grounded the analysis in statutory text and congressional intent. Nothing in the plain language of the ADA or § 504 suggests educational claims face a higher bar than other discrimination claims. The statutes protect "any person" aggrieved, without qualification.
Roberts traced the "bad faith" standard to the Eighth Circuit's 1982 Monahan decision, which attempted to "harmonize" the IDEA with the Rehabilitation Act by creating a heightened standard. The Court found this judicial gloss "irreconcilable with the unambiguous directive of § 1415(l)" because it implicitly limits disabled children's ability to vindicate their ADA and Rehabilitation Act rights.
The opinion declined to address the school district's eleventh-hour argument that all ADA/§504 claims should require proof of bad faith, noting this significant issue was not properly presented.
Thomas Concurrence (joined by Kavanaugh)
While agreeing no special standard applies to education cases, Thomas signaled readiness to reconsider the broader liability standards for all ADA and § 504 claims. He raised both textual and constitutional concerns:
Sotomayor Concurrence (joined by Jackson)
Sotomayor wrote to defend the statutes' focus on eliminating barriers regardless of intent. She emphasized that discrimination often stems from "thoughtlessness and indifference—of benign neglect" rather than animus. The statutes' explicit requirements for "reasonable accommodations" demonstrate they impose affirmative duties that can be violated without malice. Requiring proof of animus would "eviscerate the core of both the ADA and Rehabilitation Act."
Claims Likely to Succeed:
Claims Likely to Fail:
Uncertain Outcomes:
The unanimous decision correctly eliminates an anomalous, judge-made barrier that had no basis in statutory text and contradicted Congress's express intent. The "bad faith" standard effectively immunized schools from discrimination claims even when accommodations were wrongfully denied.
However, the opinion's deliberate narrowness leaves significant questions unresolved. Lower courts remain divided on precise standards for compensatory damages (deliberate indifference vs. intent) and requirements for injunctive relief. This guarantees further litigation on fundamental questions.
The concurring opinions reveal deep ideological divisions beneath the unanimous judgment. Sotomayor articulates a robust vision of disability rights law addressing systemic exclusion, while Thomas maps a potential rollback of decades of precedent through strict textualism and federalism concerns. While A.J.T. won this battle, the war over the ADA's scope continues.
Majority: "The bad faith or gross misjudgment rule derived from Monahan is irreconcilable with the unambiguous directive of §1415(l)."
Majority: "We hold today that those challenges do not include having to satisfy a more stringent standard of proof than other plaintiffs to establish discrimination under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act."
Thomas: "I share the District's skepticism that the same statutory language can mean two different things depending on the relief sought."
Sotomayor: "Discrimination against the handicapped is most often the product, not of invidious animus, but rather of thoughtlessness and indifference—of benign neglect."
Sotomayor: "Respondents' proposed improper-purpose requirement would thus eviscerate the core of both the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, leaving millions of our fellow citizens without the protections Congress intended."
By Legal Correspondent
June 12, 2025
WASHINGTON — In a decision both unanimous and deeply divided, the Supreme Court on Thursday dismantled a decades-old barrier that had made it nearly impossible for students with disabilities to win discrimination lawsuits against their schools.
The case of A.J.T. v. Osseo Area Schools tells a story as simple as it is heartbreaking: a teenage girl with severe epilepsy who cannot attend morning classes but thrives in the afternoon, and a school district that refused to accommodate her need for evening instruction because it was inconvenient for staff.
But beneath this straightforward narrative lies a complex legal battle that has split federal courts for forty years and hints at even deeper conflicts to come over the future of disability rights law.
Writing for a united Court, Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. struck down what disability advocates have long called an unfair double standard. In several federal circuits, students suing schools for discrimination had to prove not just that they were denied reasonable accommodations, but that school officials acted with "bad faith or gross misjudgment"—a standard far higher than required in any other context.
"We hold today that those challenges do not include having to satisfy a more stringent standard of proof than other plaintiffs," the Chief Justice wrote, referencing the "daunting challenges" already faced by children with disabilities and their families.
The ruling corrects what the Court called a fundamental misreading of federal law. When Congress amended the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) in 1986, it explicitly preserved students' rights to sue under broader civil rights laws like the Americans with Disabilities Act. The "bad faith" rule, invented by courts trying to protect schools from litigation, directly contradicted this congressional mandate.
"For too long, some courts have treated schools as a special category, giving them a pass on discrimination unless their conduct was egregious," said Eve Hill, a former Justice Department civil rights official. "This decision tells schools they have the same duty to reasonably accommodate students with disabilities that a city has to make its courthouse accessible."
The immediate impact is clear: families like A.J.T.'s can now pursue their discrimination claims under the same standards as anyone else. No longer must they prove malice where simple failure to accommodate will suffice.
Yet two concurring opinions revealed that this unanimous facade masks a profound ideological rift—one that could reshape disability law for generations.
Justice Clarence Thomas, joined by Justice Brett Kavanaugh, used his concurrence to fire what advocates see as a warning shot. While agreeing that education cases deserve no special treatment, Thomas questioned whether any disability discrimination claim should succeed without proof of intentional bias. His opinion reads like a roadmap for future challenges, invoking constitutional doctrines that could gut the ADA's protections.
"Justice Thomas has basically unfurled a banner that says, 'Bring me the case that lets me roll back disability rights,'" observed one law professor who follows the Court closely.
In a powerful rebuttal disguised as agreement, Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, mounted a fierce defense of disability law's core premise. Discrimination, she argued, rarely comes from hatred—it comes from thoughtlessness, from stairs built without considering wheelchairs, from software designed without considering screen readers.
"Architectural barriers like stairs are rarely (if ever) 'erected with the aim or intent of excluding the handicapped,'" Sotomayor wrote. To require proof of animus "would eviscerate the core of both the ADA and Rehabilitation Act."
The human story at the case's heart is both triumphant and unfinished. A.J.T., now in her twenties, has waited years for the chance to prove her case. When her seizures made morning school impossible, she didn't ask for special treatment—just for the same hours of education her classmates received, scheduled when her disability allowed her to learn.
Her school district's refusal, justified by what lower courts called "administrative convenience," epitomizes the casual discrimination the ADA was designed to prevent. That she had to fight all the way to the Supreme Court just to get her day in court illustrates both how far disability rights have come and how far they have to go.
"At its heart, this case was about a girl with epilepsy who just wanted the same number of school hours as her peers," one advocate noted. "Today's ruling affirms that her right to an education can't be dismissed lightly."
For school districts nationwide, the message is unmistakable: administrative burden is no excuse for discrimination. While the Court carefully avoided defining exactly what standard should apply—leaving that question for another day—it firmly rejected the notion that schools deserve special protection from disability lawsuits.
The decision arrives at a pivotal moment for disability rights. Three decades after the ADA's passage, its promise of equal access remains unfulfilled in many areas, particularly education. This ruling removes one barrier, but Thomas's concurrence suggests others may be eager to erect new ones.
As debates intensify over federal power, discrimination law, and the meaning of equality itself, A.J.T. v. Osseo may be remembered as both a watershed victory and a preview of battles to come. For now, though, students with disabilities and their families can celebrate a simple but profound achievement: when they seek justice in court, they'll finally face the same standards as everyone else.
The unanimity that produced this outcome may prove fleeting. But for A.J.T. and thousands like her, what matters is that the courthouse door—like the schoolhouse door—is finally fully open.